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6 IN RE McGEE [37 C.2d 
bank has shown no legal ground for augmentation of the 
record made before the local board. 
The alternative writ of mandate is discharged and the 
petition for a peremptory writ is dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and Wilson, J. pro tern., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 21755. In Bank. Apr. 17, 1951.] 
In re PATRICK D. McGEE, Contesting Nomination to an 
Office. ELDON JAMES MARKWORT, Appellant, 
v. PATRICK D. McGEE, Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Remittitur-Proceedings in Appellate Court-Recall 
of Remittitur.-A remittitur may be recalled and corrected 
by an appellate court when the clerk's entry of judgment for 
costs in the remittitur is improper, as where such entry is 
contrary to a constitutional provision, a statute, or rules on 
appeal. 
[2] Costs-On Appeal-Insertion in Remittitur.-Where an ap-
pellate court reverses a judgment for respondent, and the 
opinion makes no provision for the awarding of costs, the 
clerk's entry on the remittitur, "Appellant to recover costs 
on appeal," is correct. (Rules on Appeal, rule 26(b) (4).) 
[3] Appeal-Remittitur-Proceedings in Appellate Court-Recall 
of Remittitur.-The rule that an appellate court cannot exer-
cise any jurisdiction over a cause in which the remittitur has 
been issued by its order and filed in the court below, rests on 
the supposition that all the proceedings have been regular, 
and that no fraud or imposition has been practiced on the 
court or the opposite party. Against an order or judgment 
improvidently granted, on a false suggestion, or under a mis-
take as to the facts of the case, the appellate court will afford 
relief and, if necessary, recall the remittitur and stay proceed-
ings in the court below, the appellate court not being divested 
of its jurisdiction by an irregular or improvident order. 
[4a, 4b] !d.-Remittitur-Proceedings in Appellate Court-Recall 
of Remittitur.-A petition to recall a remittitur in order to 
award costs on appeal to respondent should be granted where 
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 1068; 1 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. 662. 
[2] See 7 Cal.Jur. 309. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Appeal and Error,§ 1781; [2] Costs, 
§ 60; [3] Appeal and Error,§ 1774; [5] Judgments,§ 130. 
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the failure to so provide in the original opmwn of the ap-
pellate court was inadvertent in that such court overlooked the 
fact that respondent was not the losing party, since his 
position that the trial court was without jurisdiction was 
upheld by the appellate court in reversing the judgment and 
directing the trial court to dismiss the proceeding. 
[5] Judgments-Amendment or Correction.-A decision is inad-
vertent if it is the result of oversight, neglect, or accident, as 
distinguished from judicial error. 
MOTION to recall remittur. Motion granted. 
Rollin L. McNitt and Edythe Jacobs for .Appellant. 
Spencer E. Van Dyke and Frank P. Doherty for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-This is a petition by respondent McGee to 
recall the remittitur previously issued in this cause for the 
purpose of awarding costs on appeal to respondent, or, in 
the alternative, to secure an order that the parties bear their 
own costs on appeal. 
.Appellant Markwort instituted a proceeding contesting 
respondent's election to the State .Assembly. Respondent 
moved to dismiss the proceeding on the ground of lack of 
jurisdiction. The motion was denied. Thereupon, respondent 
petititioned the District Court of .Appeal for a writ of prohi-
bition to restrain the trial court from trying the action. That 
petition was also denied. .After a trial on the merits, judgment 
was entered for respondent. The District Court of .Appeal 
affirmed, holding that the evidence sustained the judgment 
and that the courts of this state have jurisdiction to determine 
the eligibility of candidates for election to the Legislature. 
(In re McGee, *(Cal . .App.) 222 P.2d 66.) On hearing in 
this court, we held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain the proceeding. .Accordingly, the judgment :for 
respondent was reversed and the trial court was directed to 
dismiss the proceeding. (In re McGee, 36 Cal.2d 592 [226 
P.2dl], filed January 10, 1951.) Since the opinion contained 
no directions with respect to costs on appeal, the remittitur 
issued on February 10, 1951, with the order, entered by the 
clerk of this court, that appellant recover costs on appeal. 
(Rule 26(b), Rules on .Appeal.) 
*A hearing in the Supreme Court was granted on November 2, 1950, 
and the final opinion is reported in 36 Oal.2d 592 [226 P.2d 1]. 
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Respondent alleges that appellant has served on him a 
memorandum of costs and disbursements totaling $418.80. 
The grounds alleged for recalling the remittitur are that re-
spondent, and not appellant, was the prevailing party on 
appeal; that a reviewing court, in the interests of justice, may 
make an award or apportionment of costs which it deems 
proper (Rule 26 (a) ) ; that it is unjust to require respondent 
to bear the costs sustained by appellant on appeal when the 
position maintained by respondent since the inception of the 
proceeding-that no court has jurisdiction to determine an 
election contest involving a member of the Legislature-has 
been upheld. 
[1] A remittitur may be recalled and corrected by an 
appellate court when the clerk's entry of judgment for costs 
in the remittitur is improper, as where such entry is contrary 
to a constitutional provision (San Joaquin etc. Irr. Co. v. 
Stevinson, 165 Cal. 540 [132 P. 1021]), a statute (Estate of 
Wallace, 12 Cal.2d 476 [86 P.2d 95]; Estate of Steehler, 197 
Cal. 67 [239 P. 718] ), or rules on appeal (Horan v. Varian, 
207 Cal. 7 [276 P. 1002]). Rule 26(b) provides: " ... In 
the absence of . . . directions by the reviewing court the clerk 
shall enter on the record and insert in the remittitur a judg-
ment for costs as follows: ... ( 4) in the case of a reversal of 
the judgment, in whole or in part, with or without directions, 
for the appellant . . . '' [2] The judgment for respondent 
having been reversed (because the trial court lacked jurisdic-
tion to determine the election contest), and since the opinion 
did not make any provision for the awarding of costs, the 
clerk's entry on the remittitur ("Appellant to recover costs 
on appeal'') was not incorrect, but literally follows Rule 
26 (b) ( 4), s~tpra. 
However, it is obvious that, in substance if not in form, 
respondent was in all respects the prevailing party on appeal, 
as well as in the trial court; that, had this court not overlooked 
the matter of costs on appeal, such costs would have been 
awarded to respondent. He should not be required to bear ap-
pellant's costs merely because of the fortuitous circumstance 
that the trial court decided in his favor on the merits, while 
this court sustained his contentions with respect to the juris-
dictional question. The question presented, then, is whether 
this court may recall its remittitur in order to enter judgment 
for costs in favor of respondent. [3] The controlling princi-
ples concerning the recalling of a remittitur for reasons other 
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than clerical errors therein were set forth in Rowland v. 
J[reyenhagen, 24 Cal. 52, 59, as follows: " ... as a general 
rule, this Court cannot exercise any jurisdiction over a cause 
in which the remittitur has been issued by its order and filed 
in the Court below . . . 
''But this general rule rests upon the supposition that all 
the proceedings have been regular, and that no fraud or 
imposition has been practiced upon the Court or the opposite 
party; for if it appears that such has been the case, the 
appellate Court will assert its jurisdiction and recall the case. 
Against an order or judgment improvidently granted, upon 
a false suggestion, or under a mistake as to the facts of the 
case, this Court will afford relief after the adjournment of 
the term; and will, if necessary, recall a remittitur and stay 
proceedings in the Court below. This is not done, however, 
upon the principle of resumption of jurisdiction, but upon the 
ground that the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be divested 
by an irregular or improvident order." (See, also, Isenberg 
v. Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 725 [7 P.2d 1006]; note, 23 Cal. 
L.Rev., 354; cases collected in 84 A.L.R. 591.) 
Following these principles, it has been held that a remittitur 
may be recalled where the reviewing court was imposed upon 
by counsel (Trumpler v. Trttmpler, 123 Cal. 248, 253 [55 P~ 
1008] ) , where the decision was predicated upon a mistake of 
fact by the appellate court (In re Rothrock, 14 Cal.2d 34, 38 
[92 P.2d 634]; see, Holloway v. Galliac, 49 Cal. 149), or was 
improvidently rendered without due consideration of the facts 
of the case (Municipal Bond Co. v. City of Riverside, 138 Cal. 
App. 267, 288 [32 P.2d 661] ; cf. Haydel v. Morton, 28 Cal. 
App.2d 383, 385 [82 P.2d 623]), or was the result of inad-
vertence on the part of the court (In re Bill's Estate, 7 Cal. 
Unrep. 174 [74 P. 704], [order reversing judgment inad-
vertently made when there was no appeal from the judgment J). 
[4a] In the present case the failure to provide for the 
recovery of costs by respondent in our original opinion was 
inadvertent; that matter was simply overlooked. [5] A de-
cision is inadvertent if it is the result of oversight, neglect, 
or accident, as distinguished from judicial error. (Carter v. 
J. W. Silver Trucking Co., 4 Cal.2d 198, 205 [47 P.2d 733]; 
King v. Emerson, 110 Cal.App. 414, 421 [288 P. 1099, 294 P. 
768].) [ 4b] It follows that the petition should be granted. 
It is true that in several cases the appellate courts of this 
state have denied motions to recall remittiturs for the pur-
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pose of awarding costs on appeal to the losing party. (In re 
LeV1inson, 108 Cal. 450, 459 [41 P. 483, 42 P. 479]; Paine v. 
Bank of Ceres, 60 Cal.App.2d 621 [141 P.2d 219] ; Petersen v. 
Civa Service Board, 68 Cal.App. 752 [230 P. 196]; Crenshaw 
Bros. & Saffold v. Smtthern Pac. Co., 42 Cal.App. 44 [183 P. 
208] .) However, the grounds for recalling a remittitur were 
recognized and it was pointed out that the circumstances 
present in such cases did not warrant such a procedure. Thus, 
in the Levinson case, supra, it was said (p. 459): "When the 
remittitur has been duly and regularly issued, without in-
advertence, we have no power to recall it. This court there-
upon loses jurisdiction of the cause, except in a case of mistake, 
or of fraud or imposition practiced upon the court, neither of 
which elements appear in this case." (Emphasis added.) 
And in Crenshaw Bros. & Saffold v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, 
p. 47, the court said: "It is not claimed that there was fraud, 
or that the court was imposed upon or that, by its judgment, 
it inadvertently failed to state which party should pay the 
costs of the appeal.'' The point decided in these cases was 
expressed in Paine v. Bank of Ceres, supra, p. 623, as follows: 
''Normally, ... the prevailing party is entitled to his costs 
on appeal as of course. If the losing party wants to urge that 
the appellate court should exercise its inherent power and deny 
costs to the prevailing party in the interests of justice he 
should normally urge such point before the appellate court 
has lost jurisdiction by the issuance of the remittitur." Such 
decisions are illustrative of the rule that a remittitur will not 
be recalled unless the matters relied upon by the moving party 
would have compelled a different result had they been con-
sidered by the reviewing court. (See, De Baker v. Carillo, 
52 Cal. 473; Ellenberger v. City of Oakland, 76 Cal.App.2d 
828, 833 [174 P.2d 461].) Moreover, in the cited cases it is 
apparent that the court did not fail to consider the matter of 
costs through inadvertence; unlike the present case, the losing 
parties sought a judicial determination as to whether the 
interests of justice required a reapportionment of the costs. 
As has been pointed out, respondent McGee was not the losing 
party in any real sense. One of his contentions was sustained 
in every court. 
The petition or motion to recall the remittitur is granted. 
It is ordered that the remittitur issued herein on February 
10, 1951, be recalled, that the words "Appellant to recover 
costs on appeal'' be stricken therefrom, that, for the words so 
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stricken, the provision that "Respondent to recover costs on 
appeal'' be substituted, and that, as so amended, the remittitur 
be issued. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5162. In Bank. Apr. 17, 1951.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN ALBERT KERR, JR., 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Murder in First Degree.-A killing is not first 
degree murder in the perpetration of robbery, notwithstanding 
the killer robs the victim of money after striking the fatal 
blows, if he kills in anger because of the victim's insulting 
remarks and the thought of taking the money occurs to him 
only after he fatally injures the victim. 
[2] Id.- Evidence- Killing in Perpetration of Robbery. -The 
court is not required to accept defendant's testimony that the 
thought of robbery occurred to him only after he had fatally 
injured the victim, where there is a reasonable evidentiary 
basis for finding otherwise. 
[3] !d.-Evidence-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-It can-
not be said as a matter of law that defendant did not fatally 
injure a storekeeper with intent to take his money because 
such act was committed when large windows would permit 
people to observe it, several people knew only the two were 
in the store, and the victim's wife, on leaving them together, 
had said she would "be right back," where defendant had 
needed money for a holiday trip, had asked the victim for a 
loan, and, after being refused, and with the day's receipts in 
view, had struck the victim and taken the money. 
[ 4] !d.-Murder in First Degree-Killing by Torture.-A killer's 
abandonment of his victim, leaving him to die without medical 
or other assistance, does not make the killing murder by 
torture. (Disapproving contrary implication in People v. 
Cardoza, 57 C.A.2d 489, 498, 134 P.2d 877.) 
(4] See 13 Cal.Jur. 595; 26 Am.Jur. 164. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Homicide, § 15; [2, 3] Homicide, 
§ 145(5); [5] Criminal Law, § 1000; [6] Criminal Law, § 1327; 
[7] Homicide, § 249; [8] Criminal Law, § 1315. 
